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Nihal Yozergan is known as the Bulgarian voice in Turkey. She is a journalist and commentator for major Bulgarian media, for which she has worked for more than 20 years. At various times, she was the author of "The Balkans +" and "Manager" magazines, of daily newspapers such as "Standard", "24 Hours" and most recently of "Trud" and has woriked for TV7 Bulgaria and TV+ television channels. She has been a correspondent for the Bulgarian National Radio for many years and recently for Darik Radio. She has produced three documentaries, including "Istanbul - Meeting of Civilizations" 2002, "Syria - the geopolitical needle of the Middle East" 2007, which was repeatedly broadcast on the Bulgarian National Television for which she had worked as a permanent correspondent in Turkey for over 10 years until 2008. Her latest documentary "Tolerance", which is co-authored by Turkish director Semih Dindar, is about the Bulgarian ethnic model of tolerance and the "revival process", about the forcible renaming of Muslims in Bulgaria during which 350,000 Bulgarian Turks were expelled from their homeland at the end of the era of the communist regime of Todor Zhivkov in 1984. The film was made with the support of Turkey’s Ministry of Culture in 2010 and won the second major prize at the International Film Festival "Antakya - Meeting of Civilizations", and was broadcast on the private Turkish news channel 24. Currently Nihal Yozergan is a PhD student at "Dialogue Europe" Institute at Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski". The subject of her research is the new foreign policy course of Ankara and its coverage by "Miliyet" and "Zaman" daily newspapers during the administration of the Party of Justice and Development. Nihal Yozergan talks with Maria S. Topalova.
- Until a few months ago, Turkey had created the impression of a country with a strong economy and reforming society, determined to meet all the criteria for membership in the European Union. What has happened that has changed Turkey so much? Why has the government begun to dictate to people how to dress and how to behave, to prohibit words? Why has it come to the regression of individual rights and freedoms?

- It can be said that Turkey is witnessing a typical case of becoming high and mighty in terms of the one-party government of the moderate Islamists from the Party of Justice and Development AKP, which has governed the country alone for 11 years, in three consecutive terms. The success of the single party government is largely due to its charismatic leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The fact that the party increased the percentage of its votes three times, 34.63% in 2002, 46.58% in 2007 and nearly 50% in the last parliamentary elections in 2011, is a phenomenon in the modern political history of Turkey. In practice, it appears that every second Turkish voter voted for the Party of Justice and Development. This conservative party that asserts the Islamic values has ​​actually pushed outside parliament all the classic right-wing parties such as the Motherland Party established by Turgut Ozal and the True Path Party of Suleiman Demirel, permanently occupying the right wing. The only right opposition is the nationalists who have 53 seats in the 550-seat parliament. The Social Democrats who are the largest opposition power are not a real threat to the ruling party. They hold 135 seats in the Majlis. Before the corruption scandal that broke out on 17 December last year, the Party of Justice and Development was represented by 327 members. Now it has 7 members less because of those who have left it and have become independent. A few months ago the Turkish leader defined the profile of the AKP party as "conservative democrats" and the opposition called it an "oxymoron party" because this combination of words is itself contradictory. The ideological ground of this party has its roots in political Islam. Erdogan, even at the outset, had attempted to distinguish himself from the National Vision movement of his teacher Necmettin Erbakan, arguing that the new pro-Islamist party was reformist and could not be perceived as a successor to the hardline Islamist Welfare Party that, after another political ban, was renamed Happiness Party, as it is called even today. One of the most disturbing trends that we are seeing today in Turkey and which has further intensified during the last term of the government is Erdogan’s inclination towards authoritarianism and monocracy, because the ruling party is generally a leading party. Especially recently, it has become too dangerous to give priority to Islamic values ​​over those of parliamentary democracy and democratic rule of law. We are seeing a drastic interference in peoples’ life, style and attitude as well as the desire to shape a new type of unified Turkish citizen, who is appealing or "pleasing" to the vision of Erdogan and the Party of Justice and Development. Examples of this include the following: strict limitations imposed by the government, through legislative changes, on smoking and on the use and sale of alcohol, the "optional but desirable dress code" and the behaviour in institutions, the cronyism related to "our close people", the maximalism in making and enforcing decisions, including in the case of the reconstruction of the centre in Taksim without holding a referendum among the residents of Istanbul, which had led to the ecological protest "Occupy GEZİ PARK" on 31 May last year. All this had intensified the polarization within Turkish society, alienating the "other", the modern and secular urban people, who had eventually risen in an anti-government rebellion that had spread to 81 districts. The unprecedented protests in Gesine Park had grown throughout Turkey and they were called "the new young Turk revolution" against Erdogan’s idea to build a "New Turkey", its mission being "Goal 2023" and its final goal "The Second Republic". The date is very symbolic because it marks the 100^th anniversary of the secular republic created by "the father of the Turks" Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Some analysts argue that the real goal is a historical revenge and "erdoganzation" of the Turkish nation under the model of Russia under Putin’s government. Moreover, the recent developments in the country prove that the Party of Justice and Development and Erdogan have never broken off from the vision of political Islam, which is similar to that of the anti-Western Islamist movement "Muslim Brotherhood" that was established in 1928. If Turkish citizens do not hamper with their votes the plans of the Turkish leader to become an "eligible sultan" by changing the basic law, the common fears that Erdogan will fully master the legislative power and the media can be defined as real. In this case, the constitutional principle of separation of powers and the secular nature of the political system will remain only "on paper". The bodies of executive power, which will be controlled by the head of state, will establish control over the functioning of the judicial system and this will greatly endanger the European perspective of the country because of the anti-democratic events. In this case, it will not be a forecast if we say that either Turkey or the European Union can interrupt the negotiation process. For the time being, the rules of the Party of Justice and Development do not allow re-election of deputies for more than 3 times, which also applies to the Prime Minister, unless Erdogan wins the presidential election in August, which is very doubtful. Then his last trump card to remain in power for a long time will be the change in the party rules in order for him to be re-elected as party leader and, again, for Prime Minister if the party comes to power, independently for the 4^th time next year. It is not expected that incumbent President Abdullah Gul (whom Erdogan had sent to Cankaya instead of himself in 2007, and whose 7-year term expires) will fight with Erdogan to assume the presidential power.
The possible scenario is that they both would agree that Gul would take the leadership of the AKP and fight to become Prime Minister in the parliamentary elections in 2015, bringing together the party ranks after the era of Erdogan. The ambitious and hyperactive foreign policy yielded real results during the second term of the Party of Justice and Development as well as impetus to the doctrine of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu for Turkey’s "strategic depth". In this period, the country began to emerge as a regional leading power and became a positive model for the Arab countries in terms of the transition to democracy, market economy and the rule of law, and of the integration with the West. The Arab Spring, however, did not respond to these plans. The outcomes in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and the ongoing war in Syria are here. Observers are already talking about an "Arab Winter". We are witnessing the reverse process, instead of Turkey becoming a model for those countries. Turkey is receding from the West and is approaching the orbit of the Middle East and of the anti-democratic regimes in those countries, where chaos will continue to reign for many years.
- Nevertheless, the Turkish economy looks like an "island of stability" in a sea of ​​economic instability. How would you explain this?
- Two years ago, the Turkish economy enjoyed unprecedented economic growth despite the global financial crisis that had hit the world in 2008. The incomes per capita in Turkey increased three times in 10 years, mega-infrastructure projects such as "Marmaray", the tunnel that connects Asia and Europe, were built as well as a third bridge over the Bosphorus and a third airport... In this period 80% of Turkish citizens believed in the European future of their country. Due to the European crisis that had hit mainly Greece, along with Ireland, and rocked the economies of other European Union countries, opinions were expressed in Turkey that it did not need the European Union any longer. However,  GEZİ PARK first and the spectacular corruption scandal later, in which the government suspected a conspiracy on the part of "external and internal enemies" who were jealous of the success of Erdogan and his party, showed the world that "there is something wrong" in Turkey. Moreover, the unpopular Turks who are not part of the social engineering by Erdogan and whom he calls "the other 50%", were able to unmask the Turkish leader who, until then, had presented himself as a democrat and reformer, a second Ataturk and a world rank leader. This showed the true face of the Turkish Prime Minister, who had managed to split the nation instead of reconciling Kemalism and political Islam. It became clear to all that he was intolerant towards the western way of life and thinking, and that democracy was a tool for him to achieve his true goals. All this had eventually shaken the confidence in the Turkish lira and caused the withdrawal of a significant part of foreign investors. Over 100 billion dollars had been withdrawn from the country after the crisis on 17 December, according to the Prime Minister himself, who threatened during an election rally that a cataclysm would  follow if he was not re-elected. Furthermore, because of the different positions of Turkey and Saudi Arabia and Qatar regarding the military coup in Egypt last July, the pouring of "hot money" from these two Arab republics into Turkey had stopped as well. Erdogan harshly criticized the coup of General Sissy in Cairo and strongly opposed it, unlike Turkey's western partners who, by keeping silence, had tacitly expressed satisfaction with the overthrowing of President Mursi and with the arrest of other leaders and activists of the Muslim Brotherhood. The positions are similar to those of the Saudi Sunni brothers just in respect of the common desire to overthrow the regime of Bashar al-Assad and in terms of their support for the Syrian opposition forces, many of which involve jihadists, Al Nusra, Al Qaeda, Ishida and other radical Sunni Islamist groups. In this way, however, Turkey is incurring the wrath of Shia Iran and Hezbollah, which strongly support the Alevi Baathist government in Damascus. The government has been forced to increase the interest rate on deposits in Turkish lira and take other emergency measures in the banking sector as well as to intervene in the activities of the central bank, which has sold a total of 1.2 billion dollars in foreign exchange auctions to control the collapse of the Turkish lira against the dollar. Despite the tense election atmosphere that has a negative impact because of the political instability, it cannot be said that the economy is in crisis, even though the events have led to the lowering of Turkey’s credit rating. To summarize, the municipal elections will be very critical, as they will be a test for the future of the Party of Justice and Development on the political horizon.

- For us, who see Turkey from the outside, the biggest problem in addition to
human rights is corruption and the refugee wave. Is this the same
for an inside observer?
- The Party of Justice and Development, which is more often called Ak parti in short, or the pure and white party that had declared a "zero tolerance" for corruption upon assuming power was renamed "Para aklayan kara parti" by the opposition, which means a black party involved in corrupt schemes of money laundering and "Ayakkabı kutusu parti", which means the party of footwear boxes, because millions of dollars had been given in bribes in such boxes. From "zero problems", the foreign policy of this party has turned into "zero friends" and this has led to the loss of prestige and to international isolation of the Turkish government to some extent. The relations with NATO are strained too due to the unrevised government decision to buy Chinese missiles and to build Turkey’s national air defence system to the detriment of the collective security of NATO. This is raising serious concerns about the future membership of the only Muslim ally in the North Atlantic pact if the auction is not cancelled in favour of another western company. The official number of Syrian refugees is more than 600,000 but the unofficial figure is 1 million because thousands of people are not in the refugee camps of the Turkish Red Crescent near the Syrian border but are scattered in various Turkish cities and mainly in the metropolis of Istanbul. After the anti-corruption operation launched by prosecutors who are close to the Hizmet movement (Service - in English), the government responded with a personnel purge and reshuffling in the police, justice and the institutions that affected people of the Islamist movement which has 50 years of history. The people close to their spiritual leader Feytulah Gulen for years had been deeply integrated into the state machine "by courtesy of the Party of Justice and Development". The war between former allies and present enemies Erdogan and Gulen, who is called "a backdoor coalition partner in the shade" by Kemalists, will probably become even more ruthless and cruel, especially a few days before the elections, unless they agree on the terms for a truce, behind the curtains again. This clash of the titans has provoked the taking of urgent measures, including the forced acceptance of a number of anti-democratic laws by the government. Some of those are the law restricting the use of the Internet, the law on the reorganization of the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors that subordinates all judges and prosecutors to the Minister of Justice who, in turn, will be entirely dependent on Prime Minister Erdogan. A new law on the secret services is being prepared as well, which will provide their employees and associates with super-powers, thus making them untouchable and putting them above the law and under the direct control of the Prime Minister alone. Contrary to expectations in the public domain, President Gul, who is one of the founders of the Party of Justice and Development, has not vetoed those laws, which are the subject of criticism on the part of the opposition, NGOs, human rights activists, the Kurdish faction and the European Union. He thus confirms the suspicions that he is preparing to return to politics and therefore does not dare to confront Erdogan, being unable to act impartially as a figure above all parties. Observers predict that if the law on the secret services is accepted, they could follow every Turkish citizen and define him or her as a potential "enemy of the people". That is why I think that the main problem seems to be the gradual but convincing transformation of the one-party pro-Islamic government into a state party. In other words, we are observing the process of mastering the state by one party and this can lead to a party state, which we witnessed in the twentieth century. This is a big threat to democracy in the country and does not preclude the option of interrupting the dialogue between Turkey and the European Union. The question "Which road is Turkey going to take?" remains open.

- The popularity of the Party of Justice and Development of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is declining. Could he be compensated until the local elections in March? Do you expect a "change of baton" in key cities such as Istanbul, Bursa, Izmir, and Ankara?
- I think the Turks will vote in the local elections according to several criteria. The common opinion is that the present mayors from the ruling party with whom the people are pleased because they have really worked for the citizens and been tested will be tested again. Everyone can see that many modern buildings have been erected as well as social facilities, sports complexes, 2- and 4-lane roads and other transport services by air, land and water, tunnels that shorten distances, high-speed trains, public social housing, and shelters for the elderly and orphans. On the other hand, it is no secret that one cannot deny the disappointment in the Party of Justice and Development among the ordinary believers and the religious people. In Islam, "do not steal, do not lie, do not be proud ..." are some of the most important rules. "To ‘eat’ the right of the innocent and the poor ("hak") is sinful ("haram"), which is the opposite of permissible ("halal"). Therefore, one can forecast a protest vote among the religious people who have so far voted for this party. The government, however, has its own firm core of voters, who will blindly vote for their leader Erdogan as they believe in him and are convinced that he is the victim of a "dirty enemy conspiracy". This can mobilize his electorate even more and he can win the local and general elections, thus becoming the head of state through the first direct presidential elections in Turkey. Also, the rapprochement on the part of Erdogan with the Kurdish leaders from Iraqi Kurdistan, with Massoud Barzani and his team, and the ongoing negotiations, mediated by the services, between the government and PKK in Kandil (northern Iraq) and PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, who is sentenced to life imprisonment on the island of Imrali, as part of the "Kurdish opening" for a lasting and fair settlement of the Kurdish issue that has lasted for 35 years are the subject of great criticism from those sympathizers who support more nationalist views. It would not be a surprise if they support the nominees for mayors of the Nationalist Party instead of the nominees of the government. Last but not least, an important factor will be the further foreign policy role of the Party of Justice and Development as well as the diplomatic steps to improve the relations with Iraq, Iran, Israel, Armenia, and resolve the Cyprus issue. However, diplomacy seems to be put aside in favour of the election results. The latest opinion polls show a 10% decrease, to 39.9%, in the support for the government if the elections were held today. In Istanbul, the difference between current Mayor Kadir Topbas and Mustafa Saragyul (formerly the successful mayor of Istanbul's Sisli), who is nominated by the opposition party of Social Democrats, is only 7%-8% in favour of the AKP. Ankara would rather be surprised if the AKP candidate Melih Gokcek did not win the mayoral post for the 5^th consecutive time. If the candidates for mayors of the ruling party won the municipal elections in major strategic cities, as shown by forecasts, excluding Izmir, which has never elected a representative of the Party of Justice and Development, this would mean that Erdogan would have enough support for the next election round. This could be interpreted as tightening the anti-democratic measures of the regime, which will gradually turn from parliamentary democracy to a presidential republic. The restraint for now is the lack of consensus between the political forces in terms of changing the constitution. This is because the negotiations of the specially appointed committee were again suspended a few months ago, after it agreed on just 60 points, just because of the insistence of the government representatives to replace some of the so far irreplaceable members, who were guaranteeing the parliamentary and secular character of the system. Let me recall that the 4^th package of democratization of the government has made ​​possible the free entry of veiled female deputies in the Majlis, 90 years after the founding of modern Turkey. This resulted in the revocation of one of Ataturk’s revolutionary laws on clothing in public institutions and the thinning of the strict line of the Kemalist regime, dividing the state affairs from the religious ones.

- A statement by Prime Minister Erdogan a few weeks ago that Thrace is Turkey’s bridge to Europe had provoked violent reactions among both the Greek media and the Greek Foreign Ministry. Greece is very sensitive in terms of the Muslims in Thrace. However, to what extent is this minority part of the public debate in Turkey? Do the government and the opposition have a strategy aimed at the border region of Turkey?
- The statement by Erdogan in Keshan as part of his election tour in Thrace was wrongly interpreted by both Athens and Sofia, unnecessarily provoking political and public reactions in the two neighbouring Balkan countries. On the other hand, this speech perfectly fits within the officially unrecognized neo-Osmanism policy and the political rhetoric that has been frequently used recently. This policy does not really aim to conquer territories but to build new cultural, historical, geo-strategic and geo-economic relations on the basis of the old civilization bridges, when the empire was standing on three continents, namely Europe, Asia and Africa. These ambitions are identified as "adjacent areas" (the Balkans, the Middle East, Central Asia) by Minister of Foreign Affairs Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoglu, who is the architect of this policy. They fall within the concept of "Turkey’s strategic depth" which he supports and which aims to redefine the place of Turkey in the region and the world, according to the interests of Ankara. In this case, the words of the Turkish Prime Minister were addressed to the Muslim minority from the Thracian areas mentioned in his speech, which Turkey feels morally, emotionally and historically committed to and concerned about. At the same time, these areas, through the people who live there, are Ankara's "living bridges" along its road to Brussels. Many of them have dual citizenship. Let me recall that four million Turks are living in Germany at present. The Germans are not concerned about this, they are rather worried that if Turkey enters the European Union, it will be the second largest country after Germany, in demographic terms, which will allow it to influence the mechanism for decision making and blocking. On the other hand, we can look at this from another angle. The 75 million Turkish population, including 30 million young, dynamic and well-educated people under the age of 30, can be "fresh blood" for aging Europe. Meanwhile, Erdogan stressed something quite important which had remained in the background in the stir caused by the unnecessary debate on "the Turks are coming". He pointed out Turkey's affiliation to old Europe in historical terms and its desire to become part of the European Union. Think how unthinkable it is for one of the oldest NATO members to want to conquer the lands of its allies, which, at the same time, are part of the European Union, which Turkey has been trying to access for more than half a century. For 60 years during the Cold War, Turkey whixh has the second largest army in NATO was guarding the borders of Europe, NATO's southern flank, from the so-called red menace of the USSR. Let us not forget that before and after Erdogan, Turkey has always supported the Euro-Atlantic values. Its integration into the European family and its western orientation in general have been a long-term strategic goal of the Turkish state, set by Ataturk. The region of Thrace in Turkey falls within Europe, in a purely geographical sense. His election speech mainly aimed to mobilize the voters in Eastern Thrace to vote for the AKP and therefore contained a series of promises, as the people there traditionally vote for the opposition Republican People's Party created by Ataturk. The nationalist parties in Greece and Bulgaria have taken advantage of the speech by the Turkish Prime Minister to feed the fears of their electorate. Every sober-minded person is aware of the elementary truth that such marginal parties give a meaning to their existence through the hatred of the Turks, Turkey and the Islamic faith. As trite as it sounds, this is still working, unfortunately. Preserving the cultural heritage, language, culture, customs and monuments dating back to the Ottoman past is also Brussels’ concern because of the core values ​​and philosophy declared by the Union. This is Ankara’s state policy too, regardless of the government in power, because this falls within the national interests. Moreover, it is quite natural for the pro-Islamists, who are currently in power and who consider themselves as an analogue of the European Christian Democrats to some extent, to show greater sensitivity to the Muslim communities in neighbouring countries such as Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo because of their ideological argument that they are particularly concerned virtually about all Muslims in the world, from Somalia to Myanmar. However, the Party of Justice and Development is committed to the Palestinian cause, which Erdogan had firmly defined as Turkey’s national political issue during the second term of the government, thus spoiling the relations with Israel. I suppose that the party primarily aims at enhancing the European cross-border cooperation through joint projects in which it is involved. I do not think that Erdogan is making an attempt on Thrace, as Greece and Bulgaria had sketchily presented things. Imagine that the Greek or Bulgarian Prime Minister, during his visit to the border regions, respectively states that Edirne, Luleburgaz, Karklaeli, Istanbul ... are "our living history in Turkey." Would Ankara react as violently as Athens and Sofia did? I doubt it. No one is irritated by the fact that modern Greeks perceive themselves as successors to the Byzantine Empire. However, it causes a commotion when the Turks perceive themselves as descendants of the Ottoman Empire. The Greek media had exaggerated things and "added oil to the fire" with comments like "Erdogan announced the new Ottoman Empire." They wondered in Bulgaria whether he is going to revive the Turkish Republic of Thrace.

Here is the translation of the statement by Recep Tayyip Erdogan:
 "We (read AKP) do not make any difference, nor do we separate our brothers in Thrace, whom we perceive as part of us. Therefore, the urban development of this area is very important for us. Strong Thrace means Turkey getting closer to the European Union standards and development of fraternal relations in the Balkans. We are making every effort to develop all regions of Thrace. The Thracian region has a separate and different meaning for us. After the three-day marathon that began in Edirne and continued in Uzunköprü, today we are in Keshan. The Thracians welcomed us very warmly, we were moved together with them. Thrace for us also means Thessaloniki, Komotini, Xanthi. Thrace also means Deliorman, Kardzhali, Vardar. If we go back further, it means Skopje, Pristina, Prizren, Sarajevo... Thrace for us is the living witness of our common European history and a representative of our entire past in this geography. And today our Thrace, with its Edirne, Tekirda, Kurklareli, and of course Istanbul, lies at the heart of all our relationships with these cities of the Balkan geography."
- Is there any information on the opening of the Halki Seminary? This is one of the conditions for Turkey’s accession to the European Union. U.S. President Barack Obama spoke in its favour as well.
- The Greek religious school on one of the Princes' Islands, namely Heybeliada (Halki) was to be open by the 4^th democratization package announced in early October 2013 but that did not happen. The seminary has been closed since 1971 because of the strong disagreement of the Ecumenical Patriarchate with the educational reform introduced in the same year, under which all private schools, including the religious ones, had to be inspected as secondary schools, under the bosom of the Turkish Ministry of Education and the Higher Academic Council in Ankara. The question of the opening of the seminary was first raised by U.S. President Bill Clinton before the 9^th Turkish President, Suleyman Demirel, during the last meeting of the OSCE at the end of the twentieth century in Istanbul. The opening of the seminary could not be a purely formal condition for Turkey’ membership after the pre-accession negotiations with the European Union started in 2005. This is seen as part of the Copenhagen political criteria concerning the rights of non-Muslim communities in the country, including the expansion of cultural and religious rights and freedoms of minorities, which also involve Christians, Orthodox and Catholics. Conceptually, Turkey recognizes only three minority communities. Since the Lausanne Agreement (1923), just the Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities have had official status. During his first foreign visit after assuming office, President Barack Obama, like Bill Clinton, delivered a historic speech at the Turkish Parliament on 6 April 2009. "Democracies are not static, they need to move towards progress. Religious freedom and freedom of speech are guarantees for a dynamic and vibrant civil society. The opening of the Heybeliada Seminary will be a strong message to the world that Turkey is making progress in this direction," said Obama from the rostrum of the Majlis. Despite the repeated explicit promises made by Prime Minister Erdogan at various international forums, this has not been done... I personally do not expect that this will happen before the parliamentary elections next year in order to prevent an outflow of AKP votes in favour of the opposition Nationalist Action Party of Devlet Bahceli. This can only happen if the government again wins the elections alone and uses it as a tool to improve the relations with Brussels and Washington, but this is not certain either.
- Greece sees Turkey as a major threat to national security. How do the Turks see Greece?
- The officially announced new foreign policy line of the government for "zero problems" with neighbouring countries is absolutely correct as a policy but, unfortunately, most of the tools that are used are wrong. In general, all Turkish citizens, "pro-" and "anti-" AKP , supported this new course, because peace means calmness, stability, prosperity, free movement of people, goods and capital, development of tourism, trade and mutual awareness, integrity with the people from these countries because of the visa-free regime with more than 60 countries worldwide. This is in line with the requirements of the European Union for Turkey to improve its relations with its neighbours. This positive psychological climate that was established in Turkey, especially in the middle of the first, and during the second, term of office of the Party of Justice and Development, had a positive impact not only on the eastern but also on the western neighbours because it is peaceful and aims at prosperity throughout the region. Greece and Turkey are NATO members, they both supported Bulgaria's membership in NATO and worked together for it. The Turkish parliament had even passed a law on the need for Bulgaria to join NATO. Although slow, the talks with Brussels are still ongoing. The Turkish phobia of Greece is meaningless in my opinion. Let me recall the fact that during the deepening economic crisis in Greece, the Prime Ministers of the two neighbouring countries signed in Athens in May 2010 the establishment of a joint supreme council for strategic cooperation. The second meeting of this intergovernmental mechanism for close cooperation, which involved key ministers from both governments and which is something like a joint council of ministers, was held in Turkey in March 2013. Since 2006, Ankara has signed similar agreements with 16 countries, including Bulgaria and Russia. This format is one of the new foreign policy tools actively used by Ankara and it has contributed towards the development of the economy. At these meetings, the top Turkish diplomat, Davutoglu, has repeatedly stressed that the two countries share a common history and geography. Turkey's desire is to intensify the connection between the two nations and to build a common Balkan vision for the future of the region. A hope for resolving the issues with good will has been also expressed, so that the Aegean Sea becomes a region of friendship, peace and prosperity, which is in the interest of the European Union and NATO. The working formula for achieving this goal, according to the Turkish politicians who are known for their proven pragmatism, is the unification of the two countries in the fields of trade, transport, energy, culture and tourism. Turks like Greeks, Greek music and cuisine, which is Mediterranean; they like to go on holiday to the Greek islands, do business and deal with the Greeks and they want the neighbourly relations to continue to develop. They believe that Greeks are calmer than they are because Turks consider themselves hard-working people. In difficult times, they would always help the neighbours as they did during the earthquake in Athens. Sometimes they laugh at the inveterate fear of the Turks because they find it irrational. An example of good relations between the two countries is the "earthquake diplomacy," which was the success of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the time, the late Ismail Cem of the Democratic Left Party of Bulent Ecevit and George Papandreou. Then they were chosen in the dream team of the world's best politicians in the late twentieth century. Turks definitely get annoyed when Greeks call Istanbul Konstantinoupolis. If the readers of GRReporter are more interested in the Turks’ notion of the Greeks and in the Greeks’ notion of the Turks, I would recommend that they read the books and articles by writer Herkul Millas. He is a Greek born in Turkey, he has lived in Greece since 1971 and taught at the Aegean University in Rhodes. He is also a columnist for Zaman newspaper, in which he sometimes publishes articles about the Turkish-Greek relations. He has won twice the prestigious journalism prize for peace "Abdi Ipekci" and the prize for freedom of speech awarded to him by the Union of Turkish Publishers in 2005.

- Cyprus and, in particular, the settlement of the Cyprus issue has always been the firstcondition for Turkey's membership in the European Union. How does Ankara and society perceive the talks between the Turkish Cypriots and Greeks that have started again?
- Speaking in purely legal terms, Cyprus is not a separate condition for Turkey’s membership in the European Union. In 1996, the European Union and Turkey signed a customs union. Moreover, the government has to adhere to the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement of 1963 for its association with the Union that requires it to recognize the 10 new member states, including Cyprus, which joined the Union on 1 May 2004. It was signed a few months before the start of the negotiations in 2005. Immediately afterwards, however, Turkey made a political statement that it would not recognize the Republic of Cyprus unless the issue of the divided island was permanently and fairly resolved. Turkey's refusal to allow the free movement of Cypriot goods, aeroplanes and ships on its territory was in contradiction with the signed documents. Because of Turkey's refusal to implement the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, the Council of Ministers of the European Union decided in December 2006 to freeze eight of the negotiating chapters until settling the issue. For its part, the government feels "deceived" by Brussels because Turkish Cypriots said "yes" to the plan of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for the reunification of Cyprus and the Greeks, who said "no", have joined the European Union despite the fact that the international problem remains unsolved. Moreover, according to Ankara, Brussels is not keeping the promise that if Turkey agreed with Annan’s plan the embargo and the international isolation of the northern Turkish Republic of Cyprus, which is recognized only by Ankara, would be alleviated. Another problem is the refusal of Turkey to withdraw its "peacekeeping" forces numbering 30,000 Turkish soldiers, arguing that the dividing line between the two parts de facto continues, so de jure Nicosia cannot administratively represent the entire island until a final international agreement is reached under the UN auspices. The formula that is widely discussed in Turkey implies a confederation under one flag and equal political representation for the Turkish part, possibly on a rotating basis. The Cyprus issue continues to be the biggest obstacle to the progress of the negotiations for Turkey, although the decision for starting them is not bound by the settlement of the Cyprus issue. At every international meeting, Turkey seeks to distinguish its membership in the European Union from the Cyprus issue. The European Commission expects Ankara to fulfil its commitments but it would mean a retreat from national interests, which Turkish society can interpret as a betrayal. Therefore, the AKP will probably not take such a move. The talks on the reunification of the island that have been recently resumed are conducted under the auspices of the UN rather than of the European Union, which is encouraging for Turkey. Turkish diplomacy has repeatedly declared that the Cyprus issue cannot be a bargaining chip for Turkey's membership in the European Union and that both sides have to make some compromises. The maximalist policy of Cyprus on the part of the Turkish Cypriots as members of the European Union will not lead to lasting peace and stability and will be the biggest obstacle to Turkey's European integration. The worst-case scenario is a formal division of the island into two states or the annexation of the Turkish part to Turkey. In view of the repeated failures of the negotiations between the two communities for decades, this option is not excluded, although it is undesirable.
- In May there will be elections for the European Parliament during which
the nationalist and Euro sceptic parties are  about to rise. What are the expectations of Turkey for after the elections? Does it intend to resume the negotiations? Is the European Union membership on the immediate agenda of the country?
- The European elections will hardly be a priority event for Turkey at this stage. The country will be preoccupied with the second election wave. After the vote in the municipal elections, all political and social powers and dynamics will be focused on the upcoming presidential elections as well as on one of the most critical parliamentary elections in the history of the country which, instead of in 2015 as scheduled, can take place earlier if the situation is tense. Otherwise, after a long pause in the negotiation process of three and a half years, Chapter 22 "Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments" was open, on 5 November 2013, during the presidency of Lithuania, which became possible after France lifted its veto on one of the blocked chapters. At the time of Nicolas Sarkozy, France, along with Germany, strongly advocated the idea of ​​a "privileged partnership" for Turkey instead of its full membership. France alone had blocked five negotiating chapters but after the election of Socialist Francois Hollande, who is more sympathetic to Turkey than his predecessor is, there are only two chapters blocked by France. Two other chapters are blocked by the Republic of Cyprus. In the meantime, Turkey has closed Chapter 25 "Science and Research" which was open on 12 June 2006. During the Spanish rotating presidency, Chapter 12 "Agriculture" was open on 30 June 2010, which is not yet closed. The number of open chapters is 14 out of 35. With the exception of the final two chapters, the sides are actively negotiating 33 chapters. When Turkey began negotiating in 2005, along with Croatia, the most optimistic estimates indicated 2014 as the closest possible date for its accession to the European Union. Now Euro scepticism in Turkey is growing and more than 80% of Turkish citizens do not believe that their country will become its equal member one day, as indicated by opinion polls. The majority of the people here define the Union as a "Christian club", applying double standards to Turkey because it is the only Muslim candidate state. Many Turks believe that the European Union will eventually collapse and that it will shrink to the core of the powerful western countries. European public opinion is not optimistic about Turkey's membership in the Union. Personally, I am for the European anchor of Turkey, which is the biggest barrier to civilization redefining, the change of axis or the "re-orient-ation" of Turkey from west to east.
 

- There is a lot of time before the presidential elections in Turkey but
yet some trends are emerging. The relations between President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan have become colder. Assuming that the reconciliation between the two would stabilize the Party of Justice and Development, is it possible for Turkey to implement the Russian model of rotational governing between the Prime Minister and the President, which was widely discussed a few months ago?
- The Putin-Medvedev rotating model, or Batman-Robin, as described on the cables of WikiLeaks, seems to be applicable to Turkey as well. This will not happen only if Erdogan appoints another politician instead of Gul. The second option is if Gul runs for president and stands against Erdogan as his biggest rival. However, serious analysts exclude this option because he has always played the role of the second person in the party. He was Prime Minister first, when Erdogan had a political ban, but six months later, when the obstacles were eliminated and Erdogan became a deputy, Gul unhesitatingly gave up the premier chair in favour of the natural leader of the AKP and became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Then just before the presidential elections in 2007, there was another shuffle. Millions of secular Turkish citizens protested in peaceful demonstrations in major cities against Erdogan, who was eager to become head of state at that time. Instead of himself, he sent to the cherished position in Cankaya palace his faithful ally Abdullah Gul whom he called his brother. Therefore, the first head of state with Islamist roots entered the bastion of Kemalism for the first time, along with the first veiled first lady, which was unprecedented in the political history of the country. In this period that was anathema to the military who had initially boycotted the election of Gul during state receptions. A few weeks earlier, on 12 April 2007, Chief of General Staff of the Turkish Army at the time General Yasar Buyukanit had published an ultimate memorandum that was later defined as a post-modern or electronic coup. The message said, "We hope that the lawmakers in the Majlis will elect a president who is faithful to the fundamental values ​​of the Republic, to its unitary nature and the principles of the secular and democratic state." After the second election triumph of the Party of Justice and Development, the organizers of these republican meetings, including academics, journalists, rectors, politicians, deputies, retired generals and many intellectuals and public figures were under trial in the "Ergenekon" and "Sledgehammer" cases, like McCarthyism in the United States (known as the "communist witch hunt" - author’s note). They were imprisoned in Silivri on charges of complicity in an alleged military plot to overthrow the Islamic-rooted government, without being proven guilty. The slogans of the innumerable multitude in the squares in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir and other cities were, "Neither the U.S. nor the European Union, independent Turkey", "Neither Sharia, nor coup, independent Turkey", "We are Ataturk’s soldiers", "Turkey is secular and will remain secular". It has always made an impression that, after each election victory of the AKP and during the famous post-election speeches by Erdogan from the balcony of the party headquarters in Ankara, President Gul and their veiled wives Emine Erdogan and Hayrunnisa Gul stand alongside him. Kemalists have always interpreted this as an open message to the new state elite and a symbol of their revenge against ataturkism, expressing the victory of political Islam in Turkey. Therefore, I do not think that the two trusted partners will fight for Cankaya.
- Many Bulgarian citizens live in Turkey and they are usually presented as a monolithic group that invariably votes for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms in all elections. Is this true? Are there different attitudes among the Bulgarians in Turkey? Do they still identify themselves with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms in political terms?
- It is assumed that more than 150,000 people with dual citizenship, Bulgarian and Turkish, are entitled to vote. Exiles traditionally vote for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms and they have proved this during all elections, including the latest ones. Korman Ismailov's party did not receive the expected support from its fellow citizens in our southern neighbour, which clearly shows the firm consolidated support for the movement of Ahmet Dogan regardless of the fact that it is currently headed by Lutfi Mestan. The Party of Justice and Development supported Korman Ismailov and the opposition Republican People's Party lobbied for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. On the other hand, all this shows that the majority of exiles still adhere to the vision of Ataturk and the secularism of the republic. However, the political Islam is gaining momentum among the exiles, especially in the periphery of the metropolis of Istanbul, but it has insignificant chances in the regions of Marmara, the Aegean and Thrace. The exiles in Bursa are an exception, as they are divided between the ruling party and the opposition, but the majority of them vote for the AKP.